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The practice of attributing aesthetic properties to scientific and philosophical
theories is commonplace. Perhaps one of the most famous examples of such an
aesthetic judgement about a theory is Quine’s in ‘On what there is’: ‘‘Wyman’s
overpopulated universe is in many ways unlovely. It offends the aesthetic sense of
us who have a taste for desert landscapes […]’’.1 Many other philosophers and
scientists, before and after Quine, have attributed aesthetic properties to particular
theories they are defending or rejecting. One often hears that a view is ‘‘elegant’’,
‘‘attractive’’, ‘‘beautiful’’, or even ‘‘sexy’’. The physicist Brian Greene decided to
call the book, where he explains and defends the theory of superstrings for a general
readership, ‘‘The elegant universe’’. And Dirac commented on general relativity
theory thus: ‘‘The foundations of the theory are, I believe, stronger than what one
could get simply from the support of experimental evidence. The real foundations
come from the great beauty of the theory. […] It is the essential beauty of the theory
which I feel is the real reason for believing in it’’.2 When defending four-
dimensionalism, Ted Sider could not be more explicit: ‘‘It is easy to feel […] an
intellectual joy in contemplating a theory so elegant and beautiful as four-
dimensionalism, and it is tempting to accept the theory simply on this basis,
utilizing arguments to rationalize more than justify’’.3 The list could go on and on.
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The general claim that aesthetic properties supervene on non-aesthetic properties
is a largely debated one.4 In this paper, I wish to address this issue from an angle
which has not been really explored so far: I shall neither concentrate on cases of
artefacts nor of natural objects, like the beauty of a painting or the beauty of a
sunrise, rather, my main centre of attention will be the somewhat more special,
theoretical case of the beauty of philosophical theories (with a focus on
metaphysical theories). As we will see, there are some interesting issues concerning
claims that attribute aesthetic properties to theories, in part because, even if such
claims are commonplace in philosophy and in science, little has been said about the
nature of the relevant supervenience basis – that is, about what it is exactly that the
beauty of a theory is supposed to supervene on.
Moreover, we shall see that aesthetic properties of theories play a crucial role in
theory choice and evaluation. Indeed, Sider’s and Dirac’s quotes above already
anticipate explicitly a point I will discuss in detail below: it seems that the aesthetic
properties of a theory can be appealed to when it comes to preferring one theory
over another.
But before we ask ourselves what role the attribution of aesthetic properties to
theories can play, let us see how theories come to have their aesthetic properties, in
the first place.
1 Aesthetic Grounding
The general claim I will consider here is: the having of aesthetic properties by
theories is grounded in their having other non-aesthetic properties. In a different
article,5 I explore in detail the general claim of ‘aesthetic supervenience’ affecting
any kind of object – e.g., artworks or natural objects such as a sunrise – and I argue
that instead of appealing to a relation of supervenience, we should rather use a
richer, asymmetric, and irreflexive, relation, and I defend the claim that the relation
of grounding does a much better job than supervenience. ‘Aesthetic grounding’ is
thus what we want, instead of aesthetic supervenience. In this article, I will set aside
this dispute, and focus my interest on the issue concerning what kind of ‘basis’, that
is, what kind of non-aesthetic properties, the aesthetic properties of theories are
grounded in.
4 See, for instance, Sibley, F. 1959. Aesthetic Concepts. Philosophical Review 68: 421–450; Levinson,
J. 1984. Aesthetic Supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22, Supplement (1984): 93–110; Pettit,
P. 1987. The Possibility of Aesthetic Realism. In Schaper (ed.), Pleasure, Preference and Value.
Cambridge University Press; Mackinnon, J. E. 2001. Aesthetic Supervenience : For and Against. British
Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 41, no. 1; Zangwill, N. 1994. Supervenience Unthwarted: Rejoinder to Wicks,
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 52; Zangwill, N. 2001. The Metaphysics of Beauty. Cornell
University Press; Zangwill, N. 2003. Beauty. In Jerrold Levinson (ed.), Oxford Companion to Aesthetics.
Oxford University Press. My own discussion of this issue is to be found in Benovsky, J. 2012. Aesthetic
Supervenience vs. Aesthetic Grounding. Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics XLIX/V,
n2, 166–178.
5 Benovsky, J. 2012. Aesthetic Supervenience vs. Aesthetic Grounding. Estetika: The Central European
Journal of Aesthetics XLIX/V, n2, 166–178.
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Theories are objects of a special kind that possess various (meta-)theoretical
virtues, and these non-aesthetic evaluative properties of theories constitute the first
(and central) part of the basis in which aesthetic properties of theories are grounded.
Among these non-aesthetic evaluative properties, we find quite trivial ones like
internal consistency, which every theory needs to posses anyway in order to qualify
as an acceptable theory in the first place, as well as a number of other, more
controversial ones, such as, explanatory power, simplicity, parsimony, preservation
of and compatibility with intuitions, compatibility and fruitful interaction with other
(philosophical and/or scientific) theories, and also the somewhat peculiar property
theories are sometimes argued to have which consists in the theory’s being the only
one that works (I have in mind here argumentative strategies, such as, in ‘‘On the
plurality of worlds’’ where a very significant part of David Lewis’ argument for his
favourite theory consists in showing that any alternatives fail).
I shall return to the role of these features of theories below. Before I do so,
however, let us focus on two other crucial ingredients that enter into the mix of a
theory’s aesthetic properties, namely, first, the history and context of production
and, second, the informed and well-developed taste of the evaluator.
2 The Context of Origin
Indeed, just as it is often argued in the case of artworks, the basis in which aesthetic
properties of theories are grounded should include the context within which a given
theory was formed. Exactly as the aesthetic value of a painting or a novel is
influenced by its creative origins (the historic, social, political, etc. contexts
determining the artwork’s originality or even meaning (for instance, in the case of a
novel such as Orwell’s ‘‘1984’’)), the respective historical period and the context of
the creation of a philosophical theory will matter for the attribution of aesthetic
properties.
More precisely, in addition to colours and shapes, etc. – but note that different
types of objects, like symphonies, would possess other first-order non-aesthetic
properties – some relational properties also have to be included in the basis in which
aesthetic properties of artworks are grounded. These include, typically, the history
and context of production of an artwork (see, for instance, Levinson6). In Walton’s
terms,7 aesthetic properties of an object depend not only on its narrow non-aesthetic
properties, but also, importantly, on broad non-aesthetic relational properties, like
the process and history of production of an artwork as well as the context in which it
was created. Two indistinguishable paintings, indiscernible in the sense that they are
exact duplicates and exactly the same arrangements of paint on a canvas of the same
size, shape, texture, and so on, would (or, at least, could) still possess different
aesthetic properties depending, for instance, on the period when they were created.
6 Levinson, J. 1984. Aesthetic Supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22, Supplement (1984):
93–110, pp. 93–94.
7 Walton, K. 1970. Categories of Art. Philosophical Review, vol. 79
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This ‘broadening’ of the grounding basis solves a problem raised by Scruton,8
who criticizes the aesthetic supervenience thesis when he says that ‘‘different
emergent ‘properties’ can depend on precisely the same set of ‘first order’
properties’’. What he has in mind here is that one and the same artwork can be
context-dependently characterised as sad or as joyful, without contradiction. (For a
discussion of this phenomenon, see for instance Pettit,9 Zangwill,10 and MacKin-
non11). We can now respond to such an objection simply by pointing out that, once
we include the context of production (and the context of evaluation – see more on
‘taste’ below) in the grounding basis, it is not anymore the case that ‘different
emergent properties could arise from the same basis’.
When it comes to theories, the kind of relevant context I have in mind is in
particular the state of philosophical and scientific knowledge at the time of the
formation of the theory to be evaluated. Take the case of Thales’ materialist
conception of the world, based on the idea of water as the central element out of
which all other existing material entities are somehow construed. Clearly, such a
view, evaluated in the light of today’s scientific and philosophical knowledge, is
false and not very satisfactory with respect to several of the evaluative criteria listed
above (explanatory power, compatibility with other successful theories, etc.). Does
this mean that Thales’ view cannot be said to be beautiful? No, for the reason
mentioned above: the context of origin of this metaphysical theory is to be taken
into account when evaluating the theory’s beauty, exactly as in the case of works of
art. This means that, when we say that aesthetic properties of theories are grounded
in their non-aesthetic properties, the grounding basis has to be widened to include
their context of origin as well as the other non-aesthetic features – and, from the
point of view of scientific and philosophical knowledge in the 6th century B.C.,
Thales’ theory represents quite an achievement, in terms of systematization and
philosophical reflection.
But this approach seems to generate a result that, while welcome in the case of
artworks, such as, paintings, is distinctly undesirable in the case of metaphysical
theories: Thales’ view (and, of course, many an ancient, medieval, and modern
view) could very well emerge from the evaluative procedure as being judged just as
beautiful as the best metaphysical theories we have today. This state of affairs is
acceptable in the case of, say, paintings since there is no good reason for claiming
that today’s paintings are in any principled way superior to older ones, but it is an
unacceptable result in the case of philosophical theories, because it does not do
justice to the progress of philosophical knowledge. In short, we want to say that,
even if it is not always the case, generally speaking, our theories become better –
more beautiful – over time (recall Sider’s and Dirac’s quotes; indeed, all this
8 Scruton, R. 1974. Art and Imagination: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind. St. Augustine’s Press, p. 36.
9 Pettit, P. 1987. The Possibility of Aesthetic Realism. In Schaper (ed.), Pleasure, Preference and Value.
Cambridge University Press.
10 Zangwill, N. 1994. Supervenience Unthwarted: Rejoinder to Wicks, Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism, vol. 52.
11 Mackinnon, J. E. 2001. Aesthetic Supervenience: For and Against, British Journal of Aesthetics, vol.
41, no. 1.
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becomes crucially important if one takes the beauty of a theory to drive one’s choice
in deciding which particular theory is supposed to be the best). But it seems that, if
aesthetic properties are grounded not only in their intrinsic non-aesthetic features
but in a wider basis that includes the context of origin, it could perhaps even be
possible to judge Thales’ view as better (because more beautiful) than some of the
most elaborate theories we have today.
However, the impasse here is only apparent. For, unlike paintings or other art
forms, metaphysics exhibits one important feature which it shares with all the other
sciences and philosophical disciplines: its knowledge accumulates over time.
Another way of bringing out this point is to say that the contemporary context of
origin of metaphysical theories does in a certain sense include all past contexts,
since it includes all the successful discoveries of the past. This is why the
contemporary context is to be privileged over any other past contexts, and,
consequently, contemporary metaphysical theories can be said to be better than past
ones (if they are beautiful enough) and claims about the progress of knowledge in
philosophy can be secured.
Nevertheless, the general idea I wish to propose here still is analogous to the case
of artworks like paintings. Its core claim is simply this: since the context of origin is
part of the basis in which aesthetic properties of theories are grounded, the context
of contemporary theories is richer than the context of ‘older’ theories. Suppose I see
a painting in the museum which I intuitively like and find beautiful without however
knowing anything about its context of creation. Suppose further that a museum
guide comes along and provides me with interesting background information about
the relevant context, for instance, that the painting was created in the Czech
Republic in the eighties and that it has a particular political significance as a
metaphorically veiled rejection of the communist regime at the time. After I have
been given this information, I might find the painting even more beautiful than
before. Suppose the guide goes on to tell me about the painter’s life and reveals to
me even more about the context of the painting’s creation, for instance, that the
painting also offers a metaphorical reference to the day when the painter lost his
child – I might again find the painting now even more beautiful. In short, what I
want to express here is the general thought that, the richer the context, the
(potentially) more beautiful the painting will be to the beholder. What is more, it
seems to me that this applies even more clearly in the case of philosophical theories.
3 The Taste of the Evaluator
The taste of the evaluator and her capacity to recognize and assess aesthetic features
of works of art has often been argued to be of the utmost importance in the
attribution of aesthetic properties; indeed, it seems that it should be included in the
basis in which the aesthetic properties of the artwork are grounded. Here, ‘taste’
does not simply stand for ‘liking’ but a more elaborate capacity of the evaluator
(one that can be trained), as for instance Sibley12 makes clear : ‘‘When I speak of
12 Sibley, F. 1959. Aesthetic Concepts. Philosophical Review 68: 421–450, p. 423.
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taste […], I shall not be dealing with questions which center upon expressions like
‘a matter of taste’ (meaning, roughly, a matter of personal preference or liking). It is
with an ability to notice or discern things that I am concerned.’’
The interesting difference between the case of artworks (paintings, novels, etc.),
on the one hand, and the case of philosophical or scientific theories, on the other, is
that the claim is much less controversial in the latter case than in the former.
Consider Hume’s assertion that not everybody’s taste provides for a good enough
judgement, that is, the claim that not everyone is a good art critic (see Hume’s ‘On
the standard of taste’13). When it comes to evaluating philosophical and scientific
theories, such a statement amounts to something quite trivial: only trained and
informed philosophers and scientists can claim to be good judges of the beauty of
theories. Furthermore, following Hume, these qualified judges must obey additional
constraints, such as, being practised in the attribution of aesthetic properties to
theories, having a ‘‘good sense’’, and being intellectually honest (for instance, in
avoiding both jealousy and sympathy towards the author when evaluating her
theory)). While in the case of Hume’s view, such a claim is of course controversial,
since he was interested in aesthetic judgements about works of art where prima facie
anybody feels that she ‘has the right’ to claim to be a good judge of what is beautiful
and what is not (see Sibley12 for an interesting discussion), in the more limited case
of evaluating philosophical and scientific theories, disqualifying untrained ‘common
sense’ opinions only seems the natural thing to do – indeed, the beauty of theories is
grounded at least partly in their non-aesthetic features and only if those features are
known and well understood can one start to be a good judge of the overall beauty of
the theory at hand.
Much less controversially than in the case of artworks like paintings, then, it
seems true that (i) only the aesthetic judgements of trained, qualified, relevantly
competent, and appropriately sensitive and receptive philosophers and scientists,
who exercise their taste in a proper way, should count, and that (ii) these judgements
should indeed be included in the basis in which a theory’s aesthetic properties are
grounded. In short, only a trained and perceptive philosopher or scientist will be
able to notice and appreciate a theory’s beauty, and her taste and judgement is
crucially relevant to any attribution of aesthetic properties. (In §7, I shall say more
about the role taste plays here.)
4 Theory Choice
We now start to have a better idea of the nature of the basis in which aesthetic
properties of theories are grounded. We also already saw (recall the quotes from
Dirac and Sider above, to which one could add many other examples from the
history of philosophy and science) that many evaluative aesthetic judgements
proffered by skilled practitioners of philosophy and science aim not only at the
13 Hume, D. 1985. Of the Standard of Taste. In Miller, ed., Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary.
Indianapolis: LibertyClassics.
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attribution of aesthetic properties to theories for their own sake, but also aim at
providing a basis for choosing one theory over another.
It seems to be a natural attitude amongst scientists and philosophers to be
inspired by the beauty of a theory in defending it against its competitors. Beauty (or
other aesthetic properties of theories, such as, elegance) thus seems to be an
important meta-theoretical criterion when it comes to theory choice. If this were
indeed so (I should add that I myself, as a philosopher involved in the building and
evaluating of theories, feel very sympathetic to this meta-theoretical attitude),
aesthetic values would render us a great service because, very importantly, none of
the traditional evaluative non-aesthetic criteria can in fact assist us in selecting one
theory over another. I argue for this last claim in detail elsewhere14 by discussing
each of the following meta-theoretical criteria in turn: internal consistency,
explanatory power, simplicity, parsimony, preservation of and compatibility with
intuitions, compatibility and fruitful interaction with other (philosophical and/or
scientific) theories, as well as some other. This is not the place to get involved in a
meta-philosophical discussion concerning these evaluation criteria again, but we do
need to get at least a partial understanding of the kind of reasons why they do not
allow us to select one theory as being better than its competitors – only then can we
appreciate what a service aesthetic values of theories can render us, and how. For
our present purposes, I will thus consider briefly in the next two sections two
illustrative examples of the criteria of simplicity and parsimony and preservation of
and compatibility with intuitions, which are often taken to be central to our meta-
theoretical thinking and theory evaluation.
5 Simplicity and Parsimony
Indeed, when comparing and evaluating theories, their ‘simplicity and parsimony’
property counts among the most influential meta-theoretical criteria. One important
difficulty with this criterion concerns the fact that several criteria can be
distinguished here: simplicity of the structure of the theory, number and complexity
of primitives in the theory, qualitative parsimony (which concerns the number of
kinds of entities), quantitative parsimony (which concerns the number of entities).
Thus, there is not one, but there are (at least) four evaluative criteria one can use in
comparing theories. Furthermore, these four different criteria are related. For
instance, with greater complexity of the structure of the theory, it is likely that a
theory will be able to be more parsimonious with respect to the number and
complexity of its primitives, and vice versa. Also, if a theory postulates more kinds
of entities, it may then be more parsimonious with respect to the number of these
entities; think, for instance, of the Theory of Universals, which postulates the
existence of universals and particulars, as compared to Trope Theory, which
postulates only particulars – tropes – but where for each instantiation of a universal
there supposedly exists a different trope (i.e., there are as many entities as there are
instantiations of a universal; we have then more entities, on the one hand, and fewer
14 Benovsky , J. manuscript. Theory choice, primitiveness, and metaontology.
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entities but more kinds of entities, on the other). Thus, being more parsimonious
with respect to some of the criteria above is very likely to force one to be less
parsimonious with respect to others.
It then becomes a matter of great subtlety and intricacy to determine which one of
the various kinds of simplicity and parsimony is the evaluative criterion one should
appeal to in theory choice (where one can be expected to do so in a non-question-
begging way by trying to be as fair to one’s opponent as one is to one’s own theory).
We therefore often end up in a situation where we all know and agree which theory
is more parsimonious in relation (say) to its axioms and which one is more
parsimonious with respect to its structural complexity. But this by itself does not yet
enable us to make a choice, given that it is unclear which one of the states of affairs
is better – that is, we are usually perfectly able to evaluate the competing theories
and attribute to them the ‘first-order’ properties of being more or less simple and
parsimonious with respect to such and such a precise criterion of simplicity and
parsimony, but it is much harder to use these property attributions to ascribe
‘second-order’ value properties to the competing theories, that is, properties, such
as, being better.
6 Intuitions
Similar, and other, difficulties arise in the case where one tries to appeal to intuitions
in order to claim that one theory is better than its competitors. What does it mean for
a theory to be intuitive or counter-intuitive, and how is it relevant ? Rodriguez-
Pereyra writes :
I cannot see why theories in general should preserve intuitions, that is, pre-
theoretical and uncritical beliefs. No doubt there are areas, like some areas of
Philosophy of Language, where intuitions are of paramount importance. Do
definite descriptions name things ? Are proper names rigid designators ? Is a
‘simple’ sentence like ‘Superman went into the telephone booth’ extensional?
Intuitions are of great importance in answering these and similar questions
having to do with meaning. The reason for the importance of intuitions in this
area is that, after all, meaning is something we do and so we can reasonably
expect that our intuitions about meaning will be approximately correct.
But with metaphysical theories about the basic structure of the world, like
Resemblance Nominalism and other solutions to the Problem of Universals,
there is no reason to expect that our pre-theoretical beliefs and opinions will be
true. […] [O]ne should always keep a critical eye upon intuitions and be ready
to discard those that are not validated by a rational and critical assessment or
those that conflict with scientific or philosophical theories. Merely preserving
certain intuitions does not make a theory better.15
15 Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. 2002. Resemblance Nominalism, A Solution to the Problem of Universals.
Oxford, p. 217.
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Rodriguez-Pereyra describes intuitions as being ‘‘pre-theoretical’’ and ‘‘uncrit-
ical’’ – he takes them to be opinions/beliefs of untrained common sense. I agree that
with respect to this sort of intuitions, what he says is largely right. Such intuitions do
sometimes count, but not in all areas of philosophy, and only to some extent.
Metaphysics probably is among the areas of philosophy where intuitions count the
least. Furthermore, even if such intuitions were to count, their role would not be
trouble-free. They are not universally shared, and even variable over time for one
thinker – consequently, it is hard to use them to establish any permanent and
universal result. Also, it is notoriously difficult to distinguish between ‘good’ and
‘bad’ intuitions – we often have conflicting intuitions, or weaker and stronger
intuitions, and it is far from clear how to sort them out as being more or less
fundamental and/or reliable. Thus, relying on such intuitions when doing
metaphysics is really relying on something rather unreliable.
But there is also another kind of intuitions, perhaps more serious: the intuitions of
the philosopher who considers a certain thesis, proposition, concept,… and looks for
an intuitive understanding of it. Here, the idea is that mainly by considering particular
cases, examples, or by making thought-experiments, one can make more precise and
more salient some intuitions that are stronger than mere uncritical opinions of common
sense, and that arise from careful consideration of the case or thought-experiment. For
instance, imaginary cases or Star Trek stories of duplication of persons in the debate
about personal identity allow us to give rise to some more carefully formulated and
useful intuitions, that can probably do some helpful work in the understating of our
concept of a person and its conditions of persistence through time.
But even there, similar worries as with respect to the first sort of intuitions apply.
Firstly, as before, even these ‘more serious’ intuitions do not seem to be relevant in
all areas of philosophy, like in the field of fundamental metaphysics (say, the debate
between the Theory of Universals, Trope Theory, and Nominalism) that is just too
abstract and theoretical for any useful intuitions to arise. Secondly, even intuitions
of this more serious kind suffer from being too unsettled and variable from one
thinker to another and over time for one and the same thinker, and even there
conflicting intuitions, good and bad intuitions, as well as weak and strong intuitions
can arise – thus, for similar reasons as before, they do not seem to be a very reliable
guide, even if they are more reliable and at least to some extent more useful than the
uncritical and pre-theoretical intuitions of the first kind.
Take the case of the debate between the Theory of Universals, Trope Theory, and
Nominalism. Rodriguez-Pereyra, while defending his Resemblance Nominalism,
thinks that his own view suffers from being less intuitive than its competitors (but he
does not think that it is a strong drawback, following the considerations above). His
main reasons for this are that Resemblance Nominalism is committed to modal
realism, while our intuitions are actualist, and that his view does not follow our
intuitions to the place where the having of a property is an intrinsic matter. This, I
think, is correct – at least to the extent to which any intuitions concerning such
matters can be relevant. But the bundle theory with tropes requires modal realism as
well (see Manley16), and the existence of a substratum, or of multiply locatable
16 Manley, D. 2002. Properties and Resemblance Classes. Nouˆs 36: 75–96.
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spatio-temporal entities such as immanent universals, certainly have a lot of
incredulous stares of their own to face. Every one of the three theories at hand has
its primitives and ontological commitments, and every single one of them has been,
at some point, labelled as strongly counter-intuitive. I think that this is not
surprising: a primitive or unexplained and unanalyzed claim is easily found counter-
intuitive, since by being primitive, it sounds mysterious (at least to the ones who
don’t find the primitive intuitively intelligible). Thus, generalizing perhaps just a
little too much, primitives are often counter-intuitive in virtue of the simple fact that
they are primitives. Consequently, and unsurprisingly, every theory bears its amount
of counter-intuitiveness, and our three theories can hardly be distinguished on this
ground. Perhaps some will think that some counter-intuitive claims are more
counter-intuitive than others. One might think, like Rodriguez-Pereyra17 seems to
think, that modal realism is the most counter-intuitive claim in the neighbourhood.
But one might also think that an unknowable substratum is worse. Or one might find
counter-intuitive the idea that there exists nothing more than properties, bundled
together, and that objects are ‘made out’ of properties. I could tell you now which
one of these claims I find the most counter-intuitive, and you could do the same, and
it is very likely that we would not agree. What then ? How can we use intuitions as
good criteria for evaluating metaphysical theories ? It seems we cannot.18
7 Aesthetic Value and Theory Choice
Does this mean that I recommend rejection of the use of intuitions in metaphysics,
or of considerations about a theory’s simplicity and parsimony (and similarly for
other meta-theoretical criteria which I left aside here)? No, since, as mentioned
above, they can be useful at least to some extent in some debates, but also because
even if one of these criteria alone cannot do the job of telling us which theory is the
best, the combination of several (or all) of the various meta-theoretical criteria could
perhaps have the cumulative effect of selecting one candidate as being better than
the others. But what would it mean to ‘cumulate the effect’ of these criteria? If the
effect of one is such that it does not allow to give clear preference to one candidate,
how can the effect of two, three or more such criteria ‘become’ decisive? Where
exactly would the decision-making power come from?
This is where the view (i) that philosophical theories posses aesthetic properties
such as ‘‘being elegant’’ or ‘‘being beautiful’’ which are partly grounded in the non-
aesthetic meta-theoretical criteria such as those we have seen above, and (ii) that the
attribution of these aesthetic properties plays a crucial role in selecting one theory as
being better than the others, becomes of great service. In short, the view at hand is
that philosophical theories are beautiful and that contemplating their beauty is what
drives us to prefer one to another.
17 Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. 2002. Resemblance Nominalism, A Solution to the Problem of Universals.
Oxford, p. 202.
18 In Benovsky, J. From experience to metaphysics: on experience-based intuitions and their role in
metaphysics, forthcoming in Nouˆs, I critically discuss in detail the nature and the role of intuitions in
metaphysics.
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The beauty of a sunset is grounded in its non-aesthetic properties such as having
this or the other chromatic properties, and/or this or the other pattern of clouds, and
so on. The beauty of philosophical theories is grounded in their non-aesthetic
features such as those put forward by the various meta-theoretical criteria (internal
consistency, explanatory power, capacity of being included in a wider network of
human knowledge, compatibility with one’s intuitions, and of course the various
kinds of simplicity and parsimony). Thus, the claim that selection of the best theory
is done in virtue of its aesthetic properties does not constitute an additional meta-
theoretical criterion on a par with the others, rather it makes this new criterion to be
the cumulative effect of some or all of the non-aesthetic meta-theoretical features of
a theory. It does not amount to the abandonment of all these meta-theoretical
criteria, on the contrary, it makes sense of the way they function in the process of
evaluation and selection of a candidate as being the best.
One way to see in what sense the claim that aesthetic properties of theories do
allow us to make a choice, combined with the claim that the ‘first-order’ criteria
enter into the grounding basis for the ‘second-order’ aesthetic properties of
competing theories is to ask: if, first, we are all able to attribute properties like
‘exhibiting such and such a kind of simplicity’ and similar to our theories, and,
second, we all have the same ‘first-order’ data (that is, we all know all the pro and
con arguments there are for each theory, we know how they stand with respect to all
of the meta-theoretical criteria mentioned above, etc.), and, third, we all work in a
rational way – why is it that we don’t all end up defending the same view?
Put this way, the question might seem somewhat naı¨ve, but I believe it is
genuine. The answer we can then give, keeping in mind all of the considerations
we have taken into account in the preceding sections, is simple enough: some of
us are more receptive to the beauty of desert landscapes, while others prefer the
varied beauty of ‘urban landscapes’, such as, the crowded centres of skyscraper-
filled big cities. Some feel attracted by Bauhaus simplicity, while others by
Baroque complexity. Some of us feel aesthetically stimulated by simplicity of
structure, yet others are more inclined towards simplicity and parsimony with
respect to basic axioms of a theory. Some of us are struck by the elegance of a
view that shows great explanatory power, while others feel more attracted towards
a theory that preserves one’s pre-theoretical intuitions. Since we therefore
evidently do not all share the same taste for what is beautiful and what are
supposed to be the relevant non-aesthetic features (especially, their weighting) in
which the beautiful is grounded, it is only to be expected that we will not agree
about which theory is the best candidate to choose. So, the claim that theories are
to be evaluated according to their aesthetic properties does not help us in finding
an agreement when selecting one candidate as the winner in the game, but is does
help us in seeing why there is no such agreement. It helps us to see that there are
different equally good theories available, and that there is no meta-theoretical
criterion such that it would clearly have one particular theory defeat all others.
Furthermore, it makes us realise that, individually, we are still justified in
selecting one theory as the most preferable according to its aesthetic properties,
which in turn depend both on its non-aesthetic properties, on the context of their
creation, and on our personal taste, whose role it is to determine which of the non-
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aesthetic features (according to different weightings we might also importantly
apply) are to give rise to the alleged beauty of the theory as a whole.
In a nutshell, here is then how the whole evaluative process of theories might
be understood. First, the evaluator carefully examines a theory’s theoretical
virtues, such as, simplicity, parsimony, compatibility with intuitions, etc. in order
to see which ones the theory possesses and to what degree. To this end, the
evaluator must be a trained and competent philosopher. Evaluations of this kind
are sometimes an objective matter, a matter on which different philosophers can
agree, at least to some extent. For instance, it will usually not be very difficult to
agree that nominalism fares better with respect to qualitative parsimony than the
theory of Platonic universals. But of course, not all such evaluations are as easily
decided: for instance, it is very much debated whether endurantism or
perdurantism is better with respect to being compatible with our intuitions about
personal identity. Thus, in many cases, these ‘‘first-order’’ evaluations are not
something philosophers can easily agree on, including their status of being
‘objective’. Indeed, already at this first stage, the evaluator will appeal to her
personal preference, which is a kind of ‘‘philosophical taste’’, for such-and-such a
way of seeing things.
Then we see the second stage, where one philosopher considers several
competing theories that she has finished evaluating (that is, she has gone through
the first stage on her own and has arrived at a firm opinion, for example, in that
she believes that endurantism accommodates our intuitions about personal identity
better than perdurantism). At this second stage, she has to choose, say, between
endurantism and perdurantism. Suppose she thinks that endurantism is better with
respect to our common sense intuitions and, in addition, is a more complex and
intricate view, while perdurantism is a more revisionary, bolder, and structurally
simpler view (as part of a more comprehensive assessment, she would voice an
opinion on all the evaluative criteria mentioned above, of course). Her
philosophical taste will here again play a role and tell her to go for one view
rather than another, based on her aesthetic preference, say, for simplicity rather
than complexity (and so, say, for perdurantism rather than endurantism). It is
clear, then, that the evaluator’s taste plays a role from the beginning to the very
end of the evaluative process.
8 Aesthetic Value, Truth, and Metaphysics
Embracing the claim that aesthetic features of philosophical theories are good
guides when it comes to theory evaluation and theory choice, has a consequence that
might not be of everybody’s meta-philosophical taste: a certain kind of anti-realism,
at least when it comes to metaphysical theories, on which I focused in the discussion
above. The worry can be simply put thus: even if we agree that theories possess
aesthetic properties such as ‘‘being beautiful’’, why should beauty of a theory be a
good criterion for its evaluation, since there seems to be no good reason to think that
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beauty is truth-conducive19 ? Indeed, if we aim at metaphysical truth, why should
we think that beauty will lead us there ? A view which would claim that beauty is
truth-conducive, could still provide an explanation of why different philosophers
hold different views in a sense relevant to our discussion, but with the important
difference that the claim here would be that only one of us is right – only one
philosopher’s choice leads to an adequate description of the way the world is. If
beauty is truth-conducive then only one philosopher’s aesthetic evaluations will
guide her to metaphysical truth, the others being, more or less, mislead. This is
actually not completely implausible since, remember, aesthetic properties of
metaphysical theories are grounded in their non-aesthetic features, and the claim
would here then mean that the good philosopher is the one who has a good taste
with respect to those features and who is sensitive to the theories’ beauty in the most
relevant way, very much like a good art critic is capable of providing the best
evaluations of some pieces of artworks by having her sensibility more finely tuned
than her fellow colleagues.
To my mind, though, the view that beauty is truth-conducive is under-motivated.
Naively asked : are we here invited to think that ‘‘the world is beautiful’’ in some
sort of objective way and that beautiful theories are more likely to be true – that they
represent the world correctly ? Why suppose that the world is such ?
It seems then a better strategy, in order to face the worry above, to accept that
beauty is not truth-conducive, but claim that it still is the best guide when it comes
to theory-choice. Behind this strategy lies a general view of philosophy in general
and metaphysics in particular as being an enterprise whose task is to analyze,
organize and systematize our concepts such as the concept of a material object or
the concept of a property, in order to provide a better understanding of them and to
show how they are able to explain some phenomena we encounter (such as attribute
agreement, change over time, …) and to explore how these concepts are related to
one another. A different way to put this is to insist that metaphysics does not say
how the world is, it says what our concepts are like. (I want to stress that this claim
is to be distinguished from the claim that metaphysics is conceptual analysis – a
19 Compare to Todd, C. 2008. Unmasking the Truth beneath the Beauty: Why the Supposed Aesthetic
Judgements Made in Science May Not Be Aesthetic At All. International Studies in the Philosophy of
Science 22, and McAllister, J. 1999. Beauty & Revolution in Science. Cornell University Press, who are
both concerned with physics and not metaphysics. Todd claims that aesthetic properties (of physical
theories) do not help in the matter of empirical adequacy of the theory. McAllister offers a less radical
position, one which fundamentally leaves open the question of whether aesthetic properties of physical
theories are truth-conducive or not: ‘‘[…] it may still be that there are aesthetic criteria that are reliable
indicators of the empirical adequacy of theories. […] There may or may not be correlations between
theories’ having particular aesthetic properties and their having high degrees of empirical adequacy. If
there are not such correlations, then no method of forming criteria for theory evaluation will identify any.
But if some correlations exist, then inductive projection will be at least as likely to discover them as any
alternative procedure for formulating criteria. This argument leaves open the question of whether
aesthetic properties of theories that are correlated with high degree of empirical adequacy actually exist.’’
(pp. 100–101) McAllister concludes his discussion by saying ‘‘I see little evidence that aesthetic
properties correlated with high degrees of empirical adequacy in theories have yet been identified in any
branch of science. If they had, the empirical benefit of choosing theories on particular aesthetic criteria
would be far more obvious than it currently is.’’ (p. 102)
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claim I do not (want to, need to) endorse.20 But I do hold a broadly Kantian view21).
This picture of the way metaphysics works goes then as follows :
(i) we start with the concepts we have (like the concept of an ordinary material
object), where such concepts can, in principle, both be given to us a priori or
from experience
(ii) we want to better understand the concepts we have, and understand the
connections and relations between them
(iii) to this end, we may introduce new theoretical concepts (like a substratum, or a
relation of compresence)
(iv) this gives rise to a theory that is an organization and systematization of our
concepts including the new theoretical ones (note that while doing this it may
so happen that we are forced to revise or abandon some of the concepts we
started with)
If this is correct, that is, if metaphysical theories are about our concepts rather
than about the world, then when we evaluate metaphysical theories, we should not
ask ‘‘is this theory correctly and adequately describing the world ?’’ – rather we
should ask ‘‘is this theory a good/bad analysis and systematization of our concepts
?’’ Thus, when facing a situation such as the case we have seen above of the Theory
of Universals, Trope Theory, and Nominalism, we can, and we should, recognize
that there are three equally good theories. Indeed, all three theories have their pro
and con arguments, all three can be evaluated in terms of their meta-theoretical non-
aesthetic features, but still we are in a position where there is no objective consensus
and no objective way to select one of them as being a clear winner of the game.
Another way to put this is to say that metaphysical theories are theoretical and
conceptual models of reality – where alternative, equally good, models can be
available.22
20 There are two central claims typically endorsed by friends of conceptual analysis which I reject: first,
the claim that metaphysics is a purely armchair a priori affair, and second, the weight defenders of
conceptual analysis put on the role our intuitions play in metaphysics (see Benovsky, J. From experience
to metaphysics: on experience-based intuitions and their role in metaphysics, forthcoming in Nouˆs). (On
conceptual analysis and the role of intuitions in philosophy see, inter alia, Bealer, G. 1987. The
Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophical Perspectives 1:289–365; Chalmers, D.
1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press; Jackson, F.
1994. Armchair Metaphysics. In Jackson, F. 1998. Mind, Method, and Conditionals: Selected Essays.
London: Routledge, pp. 154–176; Jackson, F. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.)
21 In (i) below and in what follows in this section, I hold a broadly Kantian view, the relevant point of
which being here, roughly, that our concepts are not guaranteed to give us the world. The general idea
being that, on the one hand, there is the world, and on the other hand, there is us, with our contingent and
limited perceptual systems and cognitive faculties – thus, we are only ever given how the world appears
to us (both conceptually and in perception), but not how the world is independently of us. See Benovsky,
J. From experience to metaphysics: on experience-based intuitions and their role in metaphysics,
forthcoming in Nouˆs, for a detailed discussion.
22 Compare to Paul, L. A. 2012. Metaphysics as Modeling: The Handmaiden’s Tale. Philosophical
Studies, who seems to hold a similar view concerning this particular point, but restricts her claim only to a
sub-class of metaphysical theories: ‘‘Metaphysical theories exploring parts of the world that are in
principle accessible to scientists should be taken as describing toy models of the empirical facts, where
such models represent ways the world might be, given the information we have to date. These models can
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But wait, one of the theories says that there are substrata, while the other two
deny this claim – so surely, only one of them can be right ! No, because what we do
when we say that there is a substratum is not to say what there is in the world, rather,
we introduce a new theoretical concept that allows to systematize, organize, and
understand the concepts of material object and property in such a way that we have
a satisfactory answer to the questions we started with. But, as the dialectical
situation of the example of our three theories shows, this answer can also be given
within a different framework of concepts that do not include a substratum but rather,
say, a concept of resemblance or a concept of compresence. Thus, endorsing the
view that metaphysics is about our concepts allows one to abandon the fantasy that
there is one true theory about the world to be found, and gives one the possibility of
acknowledging that there are several equally good (even if conflicting) theories
around.
Bearing such a view in mind, we can now lighten our burden concerning the
worry that there is no good reason why aesthetic properties of theories should be
truth-conducive. Indeed, it can be acknowledged that beauty is not truth-conducive
in the sense of ‘finding out the theory which adequately describes the world’, but
this does not create a problem since if metaphysics is not about describing the
world, but about analyzing and systematizing our concepts, such as the concept of
an object or a concept of a property, the need for any link between beauty and
empirical adequacy or adequacy of a description does not arise. We can thus have a
good answer to the question why different equally well informed and rational
philosophers diverge in their choice of the best theory, while avoiding the worry
from truth-conduciveness by simply denying the need for it.
In fact, the failure of the traditional meta-theoretical criteria to adjudicate
between metaphysical theories suggests such an anti-realist view of metaphysics. As
an argument for these or other forms of anti-realism we can then point out that
disagreement among equally rational and well-informed practitioners of metaphys-
ics is best explained by the suggestion that aesthetic considerations are driving
theory choice, and the fact that aesthetic considerations are driving theory choice at
least seems to suggest that metaphysics isn’t aiming at truth about the world, in the
sense of providing an adequate description of it.23
Footnote 22 continued
be compared in terms of elegance, simplicity, empirical adequacy (to the extent that empirical facts are
known) and consistency with contemporary science, but should not be adopted as true […] Science and
empirical discoveries will ultimately determine which, if any, of the toy models provided by metaphy-
sicians should be given the status of a true theory of the world.’’
23 I am very grateful to Fabrice Correia, Damiano Costa, Coralie Dorsaz, Fabian Dorsch, Michael Esfeld,
Akiko Frischut, Amanda Garcia, Lynda Gaudemard, Rob Hopkins, Thomas Jacobi, Kathrin Koslicki,
Baptiste Le Bihan, Jessica Leech, Clare Mac Cumhaill, Olivier Massin, Kevin Mulligan, L. A. Paul, Alain
Pe´-Curto, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Martine Nida-Ruemelin, Gianfranco Soldati, and Cain Todd for
comments and suggestions that significantly helped me to improve parts of this paper.
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